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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

11 MARCH 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

11 March 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 10)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 MARCH 1970

Moscow (3723 items)

Middle East	(15%)	14%
[Soviet Citizens' Protests	(4%)	7%]
[Zionism	(2%)	1%]
International	(--)	13%
Women's Day		
Criticism of China	(7%)	5%
Indochina	(9%)	5%
[Vietnam	(3%)	3%]
[Laos	(5%)	1%]
[Cambodia	(0.1%)	--]
Ratification of Nonproliferation Treaty	(--)	4%

Peking (2792 items)

Domestic Issues	(47%)	50%
Indochina	(2%)	6%
[Laos	(2%)	6%]
[Vietnam	(--)	--]
[Cambodia	(--)	--]
Nixon's Foreign Policy	(0.5%)	5%
Middle East	(2%)	4%
Moroccan National Day	(--)	3%
U.S.-Japanese "Two Chinas" Scheme	(7%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

## HIGHLIGHTS

PARIS TALKS: PRG delegation head Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, back at the 57th session of the talks after her absence the previous week, devoted her statement to routine criticism of the allied pacification program. DRV representative Nguyen Minh Vy reviewed the communist position on the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the formation of a provisional coalition government in a series of questions addressed to the U.S. delegation.

As usual recounting only the proceedings and ignoring the post-session press briefing, Vietnamese communist media take no note of DRV spokesman Le Quang Hiep's statement at the briefing that Le Duc Tho is still "resting" in France or of his noncommittal reply to questions about an alleged remark by Soviet Ambassador Zorin, reported in the Western press, to the effect that the communist side might withdraw from the talks.

WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUE: A communique from the DRV War Crimes Commission, publicized by VNA on 4 March, routinely reviews alleged U.S. "crimes" in February, charging the United States with civilian "massacres," use of toxic agents, and air raids in South Vietnam and condemning U.S. reconnaissance flights and air attacks in the North.

MOSCOW PROPAGANDA: Stereotyped propaganda scores Vietnamization as part of a U.S. policy of continuing the war and intervening militarily in Indochina. U.S. critics of the Administration are quoted routinely. Thus TASS promptly notes Senator Muskie's 5 March statement at the National Press Club that Vietnamization can perpetuate the war and his call for the appointment of a new senior representative to the Paris talks.

SOUTH VIETNAM: Communist media report scattered actions throughout the South. LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) claims on 4 March that these actions bear out the "assessment" that the communists are thwarting the Vietnamization and pacification programs "step by step" by "dealing repeated blows" at the allies. A Liberation Radio broadcast on the 10th says action in the delta exposes the "critical" situation of allied Vietnamization and pacification efforts and alleges that several ARVN units have been "wiped out" in the area since American troops were withdrawn from the delta.

There is continuing propaganda on the arrest and trial of Saigon legislator Tran Ngoc Chau. A NHAN DAN article on 9 March cites the Chau case along with other examples of "repression" of Thieu opponents and of the Saigon press, charging that the Thieu "clique" stands in the way of "the Vietnamese people's struggle for independence and freedom" and that the people are resolved to overthrow it.

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ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCES IN DRV: VNA reports on 11 March that the VWP Secretariat has issued a circular on the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the 19 March "day of struggle against U.S. imperialism." The circular says the celebrations will denounce "U.S. aggression," particularly Vietnamization. The 22 April Lenin birth centenary also gets propaganda attention: In honor of the Lenin anniversary VNA on 5 March releases a Ho Chi Minh interview on "Lenin and the Vietnam Revolution," granted in "early July" 1969 to a correspondent of the French CP organ L'HUMANITE.

### PARIS TALKS: 5 MARCH SESSION

**PRG ATTACK ON PACIFICATION** Returning to the Paris talks after an unexplained absence last week, chief PRG delegate Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh focused her statement at the 57th session on the allied pacification program. She repeated the standard line that U.S. pacification policy for the past 15 years has been "nothing but using violence so as to impose U.S. neocolonialist domination upon the South Vietnamese people." In implementing this policy, she charged, the United States and Saigon have "spared no brutal methods," including the use of air strikes, toxic chemical sprayings, ground sweep operations, and "complete destruction of villages, massacre and terrorism against the population" exemplified by the Son My incident and other "sanguinary mass murders" committed in South Vietnam. She provided a graphic account of "atrocities" when she again dwelt on incidents alleged to have occurred in the course of "operation Sea Tiger" in Quang Nam Province in November 1969.\* In the urban areas, Mme. Binh said, pacification policy is manifest by the GVN's "ruthless" terrorization of all urban social strata. She also noted the recent arrest and trial in Saigon of deputy Tran Ngoc Chau, echoing earlier propaganda to the effect that it further exposed the "despotic and fascist character" of the leaders in Saigon.

As usual, Mme. Binh insisted that the only "honorable" way out of Vietnam for the United States would be rapid, total, and unconditional withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and the "giving up" of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration. Correct settlement of the war, she added routinely, can come only when the United States responds seriously to the NFLSV's 10-point solution.

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\* The alleged massacre in Quang Nam in November 1969, earlier condemned in a 15 January War Crimes Commission statement, is also denounced by LPA in a 7 March report listing alleged victims.

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DRV QUESTIONS ON ALLIED POSITION      The VNA account of the session notes that DRV representative Nguyen Minh Vy asked the U.S. delegation a number of questions regarding the two "crucial" issues--U.S. troop withdrawal and a political settlement. VNA fully reports all the "questions" on these issues, including: "When will the United States accept the principle of withdrawing U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam without posing any conditions?" He also asked whether the U.S. side will actually withdraw all personnel without exception and whether it will accept the six-month period for withdrawal as proposed by the PRG delegation. On the matter of political settlement, Vy similarly asked: "When will the United States accept the formation of a provisional coalition government so that this government might organize free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam?"

VNA reports Vy's charge that "until now the U.S. delegate has not seriously met these questions of principle." It also quotes his assertion that if the United States seriously answers the questions, "all concrete problems would be discussed and appropriately settled, and on the basis of the 10-point overall solution of the NFLSV and PRG, all parties would speedily come to an understanding to sign agreements, to end the war, and to restore peace in South Vietnam."

VNA's report includes some of Vy's remarks on Laos, noting, for example, that he asked: "If the Nixon Administration really wants to get the United States out of the war in Vietnam, why is it involved even more deeply in the war in Laos?"

ALLIED SPEECHES      Giving the customary short shrift to the allied delegates' remarks, VNA comments parenthetically that "as in previous sessions, the more the U.S. and puppet delegates spoke, the more clearly they revealed their aggressive and traitorous nature." The account says Pham Dang Lam "tried to conceal the U.S. acts of downgrading the Paris conference with a view to sabotaging it," adding that he "bally-hooed" about the U.S.-GVN side's good will and "brazenly blamed" the DRV and PRG side for lacking good will. Further, according to VNA, Lam "shamelessly rehashed the oft-rejected arguments about the so-called mutual withdrawal, free elections, etc."

VNA notes curtly that "Philip Habib"--his position unidentified--tried to "evade the fundamental questions which had been raised in the fair and reasonable 10-point overall solution." Instead, VNA complains, he spoke of the POW problem and "continued to slander" the DRV and PRG and to "distort the correct stand and serious attitude of the Vietnamese people."

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## CONTINUED CRITICISM OF PRESIDENTIAL REPORT

The propaganda attack on the President's 18 February foreign policy report continues in a Hanoi Radio commentary broadcast on 5 March and in a Liberation Radio commentary of the 9th which adds nothing to prior Front comment.

Repeating some of the earlier DRV comment, the Hanoi radio talk also takes up the report's listing of five factors conducive--in Hanoi's words--to the Vietnamese people's "ultimate surrender" to the United States. The broadcast alludes here to the passage in the presidential report to the effect that "allied military pressures, uncertainties in its international support, strains within North Vietnam, the recent display of American public support for a just peace, and the strengthening of the South Vietnamese government under Vietnamization all argue for [the communist side] seeking a settlement now." Arguing that these five "illusionary" points are based on a false premise, the commentary says that allied military forces have in the past been unable to cope with communist forces and that there is no reason to believe this situation will change with Vietnamization. International support for the DRV-PRG side, it adds, was clearly manifest at Ho Chi Minh's funeral, among other occasions.

The Hanoi commentary reacts to the report's reference to "strains within North Vietnam," saying the President "invented the fable about disunity within the Vietnamese people's ranks." As for increased U.S. public support for the Administration, Hanoi says that President Nixon is "well aware" of the size of last fall's antiwar demonstrations and recalls that the Democratic Party's policy council recently called for an unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces within an 18-month period. Concerning the strengthening of the GVN, the commentary says the "real situation" of the Saigon Administration, as brought out many times in U.S. press and political circles, is that "it is nothing but a corrupt, cruel, and extremely rotten regime which owes its existence to U.S. bayonets and dollars."

## INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY

Celebrating the 60th International Women's Day (8 March) with a "grand meeting" on the 7th in Hanoi, the DRV concurrently marked the ninth anniversary of the founding of the South Vietnam Liberation Women's Union and sent a letter to women in the South. In addition to recounting the meetings and letter, Hanoi radio lists women who were awarded Uncle Ho's insignia by President Ton Duc Thang for "outstanding achievements," and VNA says on the 6th that the liberation of North Vietnam and the building of socialism have enabled DRV women to "give full scope to their abilities and exercise their equal rights with

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men in all spheres." Also on the 6th, Hanoi radio reports an appeal from the Vietnamese Women's Union to women throughout the world denouncing Vietnamization, U.S. refusal to withdraw from South Vietnam, and alleged U.S. violation of DRV sovereignty and security.

A flurry of South Vietnamese communist propaganda marks the coincident international and South Vietnam Liberation Women's Union anniversaries with a report--carried by Liberation Radio on the 8th--of a 7 March meeting of the women's union and a letter from Nguyen Huu Tho to the union and all southern women. Praising the women's achievements and calling on them to continue fighting, Tho's letter also says the armed forces and people must be "educated and mobilized to achieve a deep change and extraordinary effort" in defeating pacification and Vietnamization.

Although Nguyen Huu Tho continues to be cited as the author of frequent messages, he has not been reported to have made a public appearance since his departure from the Soviet Union on 22 November 1969. His absence from public view during this period meant that he missed, for the first time, the December anniversary of the NFLSV. Such an extended absence is not without precedent for Tho: He made no publicized appearances during a lengthy period at the end of 1965 and during the first half of 1966, although he was present for the December 1965 NFLSV anniversary.

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## L A O S

## HA NOI APPLAUDS, MOSCOW UNDERPLAYS, PEKING IGNORES NLHX PLAN

The five-point proposal for a Laotian settlement advanced by the Pathet Lao following the communist military victories in the Plain of Jars was announced first by an NLHX representative in Hanoi. It was first released by VNA on 6 March, the day before it was announced in the Pathet Lao's own media--a reversal of the normal sequence. While Hanoi has enthusiastically supported the NLHX proposal, in a government statement and comment including a NHAN DAN editorial, Moscow at first merely reported the NLHX Central Committee statement in which the proposal was advanced but cautiously avoided acknowledging any details, neglecting even to mention that it contained five points. Moscow waited two days to mention the five-point proposal, in reports that the DRV supported it, and discussed the substance of the points-- approvingly--only after reporting Hanoi's favorable reaction. Peking has reported the NLHX Central Committee statement but suppressed the fact that it contained any peace plan, instead playing up the NLHX charges of "U.S. aggression" and avowal of intent to continue fighting until final victory.

THE FIVE POINTS      VNA announced on 6 March that the NLHX Central Committee statement proposing the five-point peace program was read that day at a press conference by the director of the NLHX Information Bureau in Hanoi. The Pathet Lao news agency transmitted the statement the following day. It has been customary for officials of the NLHX Information Bureau to announce such statements in Hanoi, but only after their release in Pathet Lao media.

Asserting that the NLHX has repeatedly demonstrated its "good will" regarding a peaceful settlement, as shown by its 12-point political program advanced in 1968\* and by the maintenance of its representation in Vientiane, the statement affirms "the necessity of ending the U.S. war and finding a political solution to the Laotian problem." The five points include:

+ The routine Pathet Lao demand that the United States end its "intervention" and "aggression," stop escalating the war, "completely cease" bombing, and withdraw its advisers and military personnel.

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\* The Pathet Lao news agency reported on 23 November 1968 that the 12-point political program was adopted at the third national congress of the NLHX held 25 October to 1 November. It is a broad platform dealing with such matters as economic policy, religion, minority policies, women's equality, and culture, as well as with political questions.

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+ The declaration that Laos, in accord with the 1962 Geneva agreement, must refrain from joining military alliances and from allowing foreign countries to establish military bases on its soil. This stipulation was included as point 12 of the 12-point program.

+ A pledge to "respect the throne, to hold free and democratic general elections, to elect a national assembly and set up a democratic government of national union truly representative of the Laotian people." Point one of the 12-point program had promised respect for the throne, in keeping with the Pathet Lao's consistent assertion of its loyalty to the King; point six pledged to set up a "democratic national union government" and to hold general elections for a national assembly.

+ A call for a "consultative political conference" of "representatives of all Laotian parties concerned" to deal with Laotian affairs and "set up a provisional coalition government" during the period from "the restoration of peace to the general elections to the national assembly." The NLHX says a "security zone" must be established to ensure the normal functioning of the consultative conference and provisional government "free from all attempts at sabotage or pressure by forces from inside or outside Laos." The 12-point program did not mention a "provisional coalition government," but such a proposal was made in a "working program" read by Col. Deuane at the Patriotic Neutralist Forces' (PNF) first national political conference in April 1969. As carried by the PNF radio on 2 June 1969, this document called on "all forces whose interests concern the destiny of the nation" to cooperate in the formation of a "temporary national coalition government." It proposed that an elected national assembly subsequently form a "national coalition government."

+ Finally, the five-point program states that unification of Laos must be achieved through consultations of the "Laotian parties" and that pending unification, "no party shall use force to encroach upon areas controlled by another"; "pro-American" forces must withdraw from areas they have "illegally" occupied and resettle and pay compensation to people "forcibly removed" from their native places; and each party must "refrain from discrimination and reprisals against those who have collaborated with another party."

Elsewhere in the Central Committee statement--not in the five points themselves--the assertion is made that a peaceful settlement must be "based on" the 1962 Geneva agreements and the "actual situation" in Laos. The statement also says the Laotian problem must be settled "among the Lao parties concerned." For these parties to "meet," it declares, the United States must, "as an immediate step, stop escalating the war and stop completely the bombing of Lao territory without posing any condition." This is a slight expansion of phraseology which has been in use since an NLHX Central Committee statement of 22 July 1968,

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marking the sixth anniversary of the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements. The 1968 statement demanded that the United States end intervention, and aggression, "first of all" stopping the bombing in order to create favorable conditions for the Laotian people to settle their own affairs on the basis of the 1962 Geneva agreements and in accord with the "actual situation" in Laos. The 1968 formulation omitted a reference to the tripartite agreements which had been standard up to that time, substituting the reference to the "actual situation."

**ATTACKS ON SOUVANNA** While calling on "the Laotian parties concerned" to meet to settle the problem, the NLHX statement repeats standard attacks on Souvanna personally and on his administration. It says the United States "toppled the National Union government which had received investiture from the King and recognition in the 1962 Geneva agreements" and "rigged up a stooge administration headed by Souvanna Phouma."

Such charges have been a staple of past Pathet Lao propaganda seeking to justify the call for a "truly representative" democratic union government. A lengthy NLHX Central Committee "memorandum" of 8 July 1969, marking the anniversary of the tripartite government and the 1962 Geneva agreements, had said that Souvanna "is no longer the Prime Minister of the tripartite government nor leader of the Neutralist Party," his party having "integrated itself" into the Rightist Party.

**MESSAGES FROM SOUPHANOUVONG** Nevertheless, the NLHX followed up the announcement of its five-point program by publicizing an "urgent message" from its chairman, Prince Souphanouvong, to Souvanna Phouma. According to the Pathet Lao News agency on 9 March, the message points to the "grave situation" created by U.S. "escalation" and stresses the NLHX's "good will" regarding a peaceful settlement, referring to the five-point program. It says Souphanouvong intends to "send to Vientiane at the earliest date possible" a messenger carrying a letter to Souvanna, and it solicits Souvanna's "views in this connection" so that "necessary arrangements" can be made. (On the same day AFP reported that Souvanna promptly agreed to receive the Pathet Lao messenger in a reply transmitted through Soth Pethrasi, the NLHX representative in Vientiane.)

On the 10th the Pathet Lao news agency publicized a similar message from Souphanouvong to Khamsouk Keola, the chairman of the Alliance Committee of the PNF. Later in the day, the Pathet Lao radio carried an NLHX Central Committee statement of the preceding day announcing the appointment "on 6 March" of Lt. Col. Pradith Tiengtham as Souphanouvong's envoy to deliver letters to the King and Souvanna Phouma.

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The last known exchange of messages between Souvanna and Souphanouvong--in February 1969, with the Soviet Ambassador as intermediary--had resulted in a statement by a spokesman for the NLHX Central Committee criticizing Souvanna for making "deceitful statements" and for "making excuses for the Americans."

**DRV SUPPORT** A DRV Government statement carried by VNA on 9 March applauds the NLHX for advancing "a very important initiative which clearly shows its good will and constant desire for peace and national concord." A NHAN DAN editorial follows the next day with similar praise for the NLHX program as "opening the correct way for settling this situation." The last previous DRV Government statement, on 25 November 1969, had denounced bombings in Cambodia; the DRV had not issued a government statement on Laos since 25 July 1966, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Geneva agreement on Laos.

**SOVIET CAUTION** Moscow has given meager propaganda attention to the 6 March NLHX statement, with TASS' initial report brushing over the fact that it advanced a peace program and failing to specify that the program included five points. Thus TASS acknowledged on the 7th only that the statement called for "a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem based on the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos and the situation existing in Laos." Moscow does not as a rule pick up the Pathet Lao's references to the "existing situation" in Laos, although it has done so on rare occasions in the past.

Explicit references to the five points first appeared in Soviet media in TASS reports on 9 and 10 March of a NHAN DAN commentary and editorial, but neither TASS item spelled out the substance of the points. Moscow's first acknowledgment of the substance appears in a 10 March domestic service commentary which briefly reviews the content of the first four points but inexplicably ignores the fifth one. The commentator notes that there has yet been no "official reaction" from the United States, although "American hawks" are "putting pressure" on the White House to "bar the way to a political settlement" in Laos.

Moscow expresses support for the NLHX proposals in a PRAVDA article by Shchedrov, summarized by TASS on 11 March, which says the program "opens up a realistic way to a political settlement and reestablishment of peace in Laos" and "meets with understanding and support" from democratic and peace forces.

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CHINESE Peking's NCNA reported on 8 March that the NLHX had issued  
REACTION a Central Committee statement but omitted all mention of  
a peace program. NCNA acknowledged only that the statement  
called for settlement of the Laos problem "by the parties concerned" and  
demanded that the United States immediately stop escalating the war  
and unconditionally stop the bombing "to create conditions for the  
Laotian parties concerned to meet." NCNA played up the statement's  
charges of U.S. aggression in violation of the Geneva agreements and the  
NLHX avowal of determination to "fight on until final victory." There  
has been no further reference to the statement in monitored Peking media  
to date.

#### COMMUNIST MEDIA ASSAIL NIXON STATEMENT ON LAOS POLICY

Pathet Lao media waited until 10 March--after giving ample publicity to  
the NLHX initiative--to react to President Nixon's 6 March statement on  
U.S. policy on Laos, then complained that the President sought to deceive  
world opinion about U.S. aggressive actions by appealing to the Soviet  
and British cochairmen of the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos to step in.  
Hanoi, focusing its comment on the President's "admission" of U.S.  
involvement in Laos, echoes the Pathet Lao complaint only in airing a  
statement by the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces--  
the neutralist faction that sides with the Pathet Lao. Moscow, sensitive  
on the issue of the Soviet role as cochairman, has not acknowledged  
President Nixon's announcement of his letters to the two cochairmen; a  
PRAVDA article declares that the President "made no constructive proposals"  
to normalize the Laotian situation. Peking, consistent with its suppression  
of the existence of an NLHX peace program, ridicules the President's  
talks about peace and argues for "protracted struggle."

PATHET LAO The Pathet Lao radio commentary of 10 March says that the  
COMMENTARY President, "slandering and vilifying the DRV, requested  
that the 1962 Geneva conference cochairmen help restore  
the principle of Laos' neutrality, in an attempt to deceive world opinion  
into thinking the United States is not invading Laos." Consistent  
with this comment, the NLHX Central Committee statement advancing the  
five-point proposal notably failed to appeal to participants in the  
1961-62 Geneva conference, as prior NLHX statements had done, addressing  
a call only to governments which love peace and justice and to the  
people of America and the world to demand that the United States  
stop the war; it denounced the United States and Vientiane for resorting  
to "deceitful allegations about 'peace,'" but it did not go on--as the  
20 February NLHX statement had done--to ridicule the United States and  
its "puppets" for having "clamored for the holding of a new Geneva  
conference."

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A statement by the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces dated 7 March, carried by Hanoi's VNA on the 11th, combines an expression of support for the NLHX five-point program with the comment that President Nixon and Souvanna Phouma "revealed their perfidy" and their "scheme to expand the war" when they sent messages to the Geneva cochairmen "slandering the NLHX and the DRV Government and proposing the convening of the Geneva conference on Laos."

The 10 March Pathet Lao radio commentary says the President's statement showed that "he had no good will in solving the Laotian question through peaceful means," having made public his intention to continue the war in Laos. It demands that the United States "implement" the five-point solution and let the Laotian people solve their own internal affairs. It asserts that the "Laotian patriotic forces" have "matured" and become a "political force," and it insists that no problems concerning Laos can be solved "without the approval of the NLHX."

HANOI            DRV comment is expressed most authoritatively in the government  
COMMENT        statement on the NLHX proposal. The statement says that the war in Laos has been "escalated" since President Nixon took office and that, faced with this "irrefutable truth" and with the "wave of protest" in the United States and throughout the world, the President was "forced to admit" that the United States had become more and more deeply involved in Laos. In other comment Hanoi says the President made the statement in response to domestic criticism, and on 9 March a NHAN DAN Commentator article caps the attack with the remark that President Nixon wanted to "appease public concern" but has been "unmasked as a big liar."

The government statement remarks that President Nixon was forced to "concede that U.S. aircraft had been bombing Laotian territory," and a VNA commentary on the 8th says he "had to admit evasively" that American planes flew "reconnaissance" and "combat missions." He thus "for the first time personally admitted" U.S. bombings in Laos, the commentary adds.

In the NHAN DAN Commentator article and elsewhere, Hanoi says the President "denied the presence of U.S. combat troops" except for 1,040 "U.S. advisers and personnel." NHAN DAN repeats the charge that there are 12,000 U.S. "military advisers and personnel" in Laos who are "commanding and taking part in all military activities of the Laotian reactionary forces."\*

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\* See the FBIS SURVEY of 9 October 1969, pages 1-3, for a discussion of propaganda charges that the United States has 12,000 military personnel in Laos.

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The wars in Laos and Vietnam are linked in the government statement and in other Hanoi comment noting that the President "conceded" that the United States uses Laotian territory "to serve the U.S. aggressive war in Vietnam." The 8 March VNA commentary says the President argued that "U.S. planes were bombing Laos" to save American and allied lives in South Vietnam, thereby "acknowledging" that the United States uses Laos as a military base in support of the war in South Vietnam. (At the 5 March Paris session, DRV representative Nguyen Minh Vy charged that the United States is trying to "retrieve its defeat" in Vietnam by escalating the war in Laos.)

Hanoi also rebuts the President's statement on the DRV troop presence in Laos, but without acknowledging his remark that DRV troops in Laos are at an all-time high of 67,000. The government statement merely says he "distorted the truth" and "impudently accused the DRV in an attempt to justify U.S. aggression in Laos." The VNA commentary says President Nixon "rehashed the slander about North Vietnam's escalation in Laos and North Vietnam's continued infiltration into Laos." The NHAN DAN Commentator article similarly says he tried to "blame the tension in Laos on North Vietnam's continual infiltration into Laos."

MOSCOW COMMENT Like Hanoi, Moscow emphasizes the theme that the President was "forced to admit" that the United States bombs Laotian territory and that there are "over 1,000 Americans, mostly 'military advisers,'" in Laos. These points appear in the initial TASS report, in a Zhukov PRAVDA article on the 9th, and in a radio commentary. The TASS report adds that although he said there are no U.S. "ground detachments" in Laos, the President confirmed that the United States is "taking part in military operations on the side of the rightist forces."

Again like Hanoi, Moscow says that the statement was designed to offset criticism of the Administration's Laotian policy but that it was nevertheless received with "dissatisfaction," and Soviet commentators note critical remarks by senators and in the press.

TASS on 8 March reports VNA as saying the President "repeated the concoction on the North Vietnamese escalation in Laos to conceal American crimes," but Moscow does not emphasize this charge in its own comment. Rather, in some comment linking the wars in Vietnam and Laos, Moscow charges that the United States is trying to use Laos in its "aggression" against the Vietnamese. An 8 March domestic service talk by Kharkov on the President's statement cites the Washington POST as remarking that Laos and South Vietnam are too closely linked to be regarded separately and that the United States looks on Laos as "a kind of bridgehead." In the 8 March domestic

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roundtable discussion, one panelist--without mentioning the President's statement--notes allegations "in Washington" that U.S. operations in Laos are needed "to cut off arms supplies to North Vietnam" and rejoins that such supplies cannot in fact be sent from the Plain of Jars; hence it is not really a matter of the United States wanting to cut off supplies "from North to South Vietnam," but of intervention in "a completely independent civil war" in northern Laos.

Soviet reports and comment on the President's statement fail to mention his announcement that he sent letters to the Soviet and British Geneva cochairmen asking their help in restoring the 1962 agreements, and Shchedrov states in a PRAVDA article on 11 March that the President made "no constructive proposals" for "normalizing" the situation in Laos. In the 9 March PRAVDA article, charging the United States with responsibility for the Laotian war, Zhukov recalls that warnings about the "dangerous situation" had been made in the TASS statement of 28 February and "by the Soviet Government" last November, but fails to specify that the latter was a statement sent to the 1962 Geneva conference participants by Gromyko as conference cochairmen.

PEKING COMMENT Peking's first comment on the President's statement, carried by NCNA on 8 March, notes that it said U.S. actions in Laos are "aimed at bringing about conditions for progress toward peace in the entire Indochinese peninsula" but also defined the primary American objective as protection of U.S. and allied troops in South Vietnam. Remarking on this "gangster's logic," NCNA says that while the United States expands the war in Laos allegedly to protect its independence and neutrality, the President "admitted" that U.S. aggression in Laos is intensifying and that the United States will continue to increase the "wanton bombing," thus demonstrating that U.S. policy in Indochina "will never change." The commentary expresses confidence that the Laotian people will persist in "protracted war" and win final victory.

A subsequent NCNA commentary, on 11 March, asserts that the President issued his statement in the face of world condemnation of intensified U.S. aggression and that he was "playing counterrevolutionary dual tactics" when he "hypocritically" said the United States intends to reduce its involvement in Laos.

In a 5 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, pegged to the 28 February NLHX Central Committee statement which acclaimed the Plain of Jars victory, Peking ridicules President Nixon for having talked ever since he assumed office about "respecting neutrality" and "seeking peace" in Laos, when in fact U.S. aggression in Laos has become "even more blatant and flagrant." Commentator charges that the Nixon Administration

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regards intensification of the war in Laos as an important measure in coordinating with the Vietnamization policy in Vietnam, and it scores the Americans for continuing to apply "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" in both Laos and Vietnam. PEOPLE'S DAILY concludes by expressing the Chinese people's "resolute support" for the Laotian people's "protracted struggle."

Peking does not as a rule support NLHX statements in this manner and in fact rarely comments on Laos except in speeches and message on appropriate anniversaries, normally limiting itself to news reports citing Pathet Lao media. Chinese propaganda on the 20th anniversary of the Laotian People's Liberation Army (LPLA), celebrated on 20 January 1969, included attacks on U.S. "plots and tricks" and on "political deception" regarding "peace talks," as had a 26 December 1968 NCNA roundup of the year's revolutionary events in Laos. No such comments appeared, however, in Peking's roundup of the 1969 revolutionary situation or in comment on the 21st LPLA anniversary.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW CONTINUES PROTEST CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISRAEL, ZIONISM

Through the week ending 8 March Moscow sustained its protest campaign against Israeli "aggression," along with continued denunciations of Zionism and defensive protestations by Soviet Jewish citizens that no "Jewish national question" exists in the Soviet Union. The protest campaign, which appears now to be diminishing, has included reports of statements by individuals and groups representing various sectors of Soviet society, with broadcasts in Arabic carrying expressions of support for the Arabs by Soviet Moslem leaders and regional radios broadcasting accounts of local protest meetings. TASS has transmitted interviews with officials of peace organizations in East European countries expressing "indignation" at Israeli policy.

Almost half the volume of Moscow's protest propaganda in the past week consisted of publicity for the 4 March press conference of Soviet Jews at the Moscow House of Friendship under the auspices of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. As in other comment, participants in the conference sought to distinguish between Israel's "extremist" leadership and its working people and "progressive forces." PRAVDA on 10 March, according to the domestic service, publishes "at readers' request" a summary of the thesis on "the Jewish question and Zionism in our time" adopted by the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) at its 16th congress in January-February 1969. It was also at the request of "many readers" that PRAVDA on 28 February had carried a summary of the report delivered at the congress.

In thematic content the propaganda follows standard lines, pressing for Israeli withdrawal as the main element of a peaceful solution of the crisis. There are still expressions of outrage at the 12 February Israeli bombing of the UAR plant at Abu Zabal, and some propaganda attention is devoted to the 3 March Israeli attack on "residential areas" of Suez. A commentary by Vasilyev in the 9 March PRAVDA says U.S. backing makes such attacks possible and notes that Israel will "soon obtain deliveries of a new batch" of U.S. aircraft. He cites "world press" reports that U.S. pilots who gained experience in Southeast Asia "are also sitting at the controls of Israeli aircraft."

The pending U.S. decision on possible delivery of further Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft to Israel is the subject of speculation by panelists in the domestic service commentators' roundtable of 8 March. A broadcast in English to North America on the 10th, by "military observer" Maj. Gen. Kozlov, remarks that Israel's desire to possess "offensive" Phantoms is not dictated by defense needs. Kozlov states that the Arab countries have a "completely up-to-date defensive air force" and that their military targets are "reliably protected by an

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extensive, effective antiaircraft system." He notes with approval that the Arab governments are refraining from "extreme retaliatory measures," adding that this restraint indicates that the Arabs "refuse to be provoked and will not expand the scale of the war."

Propagandists again display sensitivity to the idea that the Soviet Union is seeking special status in the Middle East. In a 4 March foreign-language commentary Kudryavtsev says the USSR does not want the Middle East to be used by any state "as a base for operations against its southern, European areas" and that therefore it is "out of the question" for the USSR to stake out a special position for itself in the Middle East. Panelists in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on 1 March react to the passage in President Nixon's foreign policy report in which "he states plainly and quite clearly and unambiguously that the Soviet Union wants a dominating position" in the region for itself. Matveyev rejoins that there is nothing to support the contention that Soviet policy "is allegedly dictated by some sort of narrow mercenary motives," while U.S. oil investments show that "the good gentlemen in Washington" themselves seek advantages in the Middle East.

Other propaganda discounts any notion of Soviet interest in Middle East oil: TASS on 3 March reports a LITERARY GAZETTE interview with the Soviet first deputy minister for petroleum extraction in which he "refuted fabrications of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR" to the effect that the oil situation in East European countries was deteriorating rapidly and that it "was high time for the Russians to think of how they could get hold of Middle East oil." The minister insisted that Soviet oil reserves were huge and that the USSR "cannot complain about insufficient oil resources." Moscow subsequently broadcast his statement in Arabic as well as in English to North America and in German.

Current comment pays relatively little attention to the substantive aspects of a Middle East settlement. In a domestic service commentary on the 9th Yefremov revives standard criticism of the U.S. proposals in castigating James Reston for writing in the New York TIMES that the conflict can be solved through a compromise guaranteed by the power and resolve of the United States. Yefremov complains that as Reston presents it, Washington "would like to place itself above other permanent members of the Security Council" and play the role of "some kind of supreme disinterested international arbiter." If the United States really wants the restoration of peace, he adds, it could make a "real and considerable contribution" by "stopping supplies of offensive weapons to the uncontrollable Israeli military and convincing Israel it should leave Arab territory."

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A panelist in the 1 March domestic service commentators' roundtable looks to the four-power talks in New York as an approach to a political settlement, which the USSR continues to view as "the only reasonable way" to a Middle East solution. On the same program, PRAVDA's Belyayev recalls that the Soviet Union "once proposed a special session" of the UN General Assembly--a topic long absent from Soviet propaganda. In the context--that "Arab and peaceloving people have not forgotten" this action--Belyayev seemingly seeks more to underline past Soviet initiatives than to hint at future ones.

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## STRATEGIC ARMS

## PRAVDA "OBSERVER" ATTACKS LAIRD BUT SIGNALS NO CHANGE ON SALT

An article in PRAVDA on 7 March over the authoritative signature "Observer" (Obozrevatel) underscores Moscow's continuing concern over U.S. defense policy but appears to signal no basic change in the cautiously optimistic Soviet posture toward the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) scheduled to open in Vienna on 16 April. Widely summarized by Radio Moscow for foreign audiences, the article does little more than sum up themes which have been prominent in less authoritative comment and reportage since the closing of the Helsinki phase of the talks in December.

Observer levels a sharp attack against Secretary Laird, who has "recently made a whole series of public speeches in which he persistently calls for the buildup of various systems of strategic armaments," including the expansion of the Safeguard ABM system. The article notes that last year, in seeking Congressional approval of funds for the first stage of Safeguard, the Administration had indicated that further development of the system would depend to a large extent on the outcome of SALT; "now U.S. leaders prefer not to recall this." In addition to his "zealous" advocacy of an accelerated Safeguard, Observer says, Laird has called for the creation of new offensive weapons--a new strategic bomber to replace the B-52, improved underwater long-range offensive systems, "an improved offensive intercontinental ballistic missile, and so forth."

The Observer article does not mention plans for multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), although less authoritative comment continues to complain about U.S. development of the vehicles. A foreign-language commentary by Shakhov on 7 March, for example, notes that the decision "to mass-produce multiple warhead vehicles was taken on the eve of the opening of U.S.-Soviet talks on issues regarding the restraining of the strategic arms race."

The PRAVDA article rejects Laird's contention that the new programs are justified by the existence of "a 'Soviet threat,'" countering that it is "well known that the measures implemented in the USSR in the postwar period to strengthen its defense capability were a reply to the unrestrained arms race in nuclear missiles and other arms whipped up by the United States." Citing the U.S. press, Observer says Laird's campaign is symptomatic of "the military's excessive influence" and serves the "military-industrial complex" which would like "to start a new expensive round in the strategic arms race, whip up a militaristic tendency in Washington's foreign policy, and lead matters to a further exacerbation of international tension." He goes on to note that Laird's speeches are "legitimately regarded by the

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public as a statement or reflection of the U.S. ruling circles' positions" and asks rhetorically to what extent the Secretary's "militaristic appeals reflect the position of the U.S. Government."

Despite its sharp attack on Laird and the "military-industrial complex" and its questioning of U.S. sincerity in the negotiations--a propaganda tack which lays groundwork for blaming the United States in case the talks collapse--the article registers the same attitude of cautious optimism that has marked Soviet comment since the Helsinki phase of SALT in November-December. It reaffirms, for example, the "serious" Soviet approach to the talks, drawing on USSR delegate Semenov's statement in Helsinki as well as on U.S. spokesmen's remarks taking note of Soviet seriousness. It points to the futility of a spiraling arms race, both from the economic point of view and from the military point of view, and it cites former presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy to the effect that "a strategic nuclear engagement cannot lead to any kind of gain." A 23 February domestic service commentary on President Nixon's 18 February foreign policy report had noted that the President observed "realistically" that both the United States and the USSR "have acquired the capability of inflicting on each other unacceptable damage, regardless of who strikes first. The power which provokes an exchange of thermonuclear strikes will gain no advantage and certainly win no victory."

Observer concludes that "despite the difficulties, it is obvious that there is still time and there are still possibilities for reaching an understanding." The "indispensable" conditions, he says, are the presence of good will on both sides and the holding of "honest talks without striving to obtain any unilateral military advantages."

KOSYGIN        Two days prior to the Observer article, at the 5 March  
COMMENT        Moscow ceremony for deposition of the instruments of  
                 ratification of the nonproliferation treaty, Premier Kosygin  
had also called for good will on the part of both sides in the arms talks. He declared that the Soviet Government attaches "great importance" to the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on strategic arms limitation and is now preparing for the Vienna phase of the talks "in all seriousness." Reporting the Washington ceremony, TASS on the 5th said President Nixon expressed the hope that a "favorable atmosphere" will be created at the Vienna talks. On 27 February, noting that the President had submitted his annual report to Congress on the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, TASS had reported the President as indicating that the "serious exchange" at Helsinki augurs well for the deliberations in Vienna.

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## SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

## PEKING DERIDES PARTNERSHIP THEME IN NIXON FOREIGN POLICY

A substantial body of low-level Peking comment on President Nixon's foreign policy report continues to draw a picture of the United States as a declining power with a bankrupt global strategy. Notably absent from this picture is any effort to portray the United States as a threat to China, nor has Peking staked out a position on key issues dividing the two countries. Moreover, Peking remains silent on U.S. initiatives for an improvement of bilateral relations. Formerly, when conveying a quite different attitude, Peking depicted U.S. policies as directed at an encirclement of the PRC and scornfully rejected specific proposals for improving relations.

Peking's comment has focused on the President's call for "partnership" in dealing with allies and friendly nations. The partnership theme is the subject of articles in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 5 and 7 March which deride the President's 18 February foreign policy report as a futile effort to develop a new "counterrevolutionary" global strategy at a time when U.S. strength is being seriously eroded. Both articles give broad-brush portrayals of a world situation in which the United States is being challenged both by its allies and by revolutionary movements across the globe.

A more detailed analysis of the Administration's new Asian policy, viewed against a background of postwar U.S. strategies in that area, is contained in an NCNA commentary on the 7th. Mention of the Chinese civil war is followed by the observation that today the PRC "stands firm" in Asia as the "powerful anti-imperialist and antirevisionist political force" of the present era, "the most reliable friend of the oppressed people," and "the hope of the world revolution." NCNA gives a standard list of armed struggles going on in Asia and uses the Vietnam war as evidence that the United States is a paper tiger. In discussing the operation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia, the NCNA commentary reflects Peking's concern over the role being assigned to Japan. Indicating a hope to draw upon residual anti-Japanese sentiment, NCNA claims that such a role can only arouse fierce opposition among people of various countries that had been victimized by the Japanese during World War II.

Peking has made use of French President Pompidou's visit to the United States to fill in the picture of diminishing U.S. strength by playing up signs of French independence and conflicts of interest between Paris and Washington. An NCNA report on 4 March, which characterized the U.S. situation today as one of "utter passivity," quoted the President as calling for a reduction of commitments around the world where the United States is overextended and placing emphasis on

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priority areas "such as Europe." Significantly, it was precisely this observation which Peking selected as its sole citation from Mr. Nixon's campaign statements in commenting on the presidential election of 1968--that is, during another period when Peking studiously avoided foreclosing its options toward the United States at a time when resumption of the Warsaw talks was envisaged.

Both the 4 March report and an article carried by NCNA on the 8th made a point of citing Pompidou's reaffirmations of an independent French line. In the first report, NCNA quoted the French President as referring to SALT as "a way of sharing hegemony" and as a "danger" for countries in both West and East Europe. The article on the 8th, taking note of hostile demonstrations and snubs directed at Pompidou, viewed the visit as a partnership "farce" personally directed by President Nixon right on the heels of his foreign policy report, in which he "bragged about so-called 'partnership.'" NCNA charged that President Nixon tried to bully his visitor by demanding the restationing of U.S. troops in France.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## TENSIONS REFLECTED AS MOSCOW, PEKING PURSUE POLEMICS

As Moscow and Peking continue routine polemical skirmishing, the tense facts of life in Sino-Soviet relations have been reflected in the two sides' media a year after the outbreak of fighting on the Ussuri. A Soviet cosmonaut has invoked the memory of the Damanskiy Island clashes in an article in RED STAR on 5 March recounting his visit to border outposts near the area of the clashes. The article strikes a note of "high vigilance" along the border, though without indicating a particularly troubled situation at present. Serving as a reminder of the border problem without being provocative, the article seems designed to foster a sense of identity between the Soviet heartland and distant borderlands--an effort much in evidence in Soviet propaganda following the clashes last year. On the Chinese side, in addition to a new attack on the Brezhnev leadership, Peking has disseminated an article by an Indian communist which evokes a sense of war danger in notably stark terms, though it does not mention the border problem.

MOSCOW While it makes no direct reference to Sino-Soviet border incidents in 1969, cosmonaut Volkov's 5 March RED STAR article pointedly recalls an earlier meeting with "the heroes of Damanskiy." Recounting his tour of outposts in the Far Eastern Military District, he describes his flight into Iman--"the same Iman which was recently on everybody's lips"--where he was met by the border guards, one of whom he recognized "because of the photographs in the newspapers." Emphasizing that on the frontier "everyone must be prepared for exploits," Volkov closes with the assurance that "the loyal sons of the socialist fatherland" in the Far East have the weaponry to defend the country.

The central press continues to take note of anti-Soviet campaigns in the PRC. A TASS report on 4 March, published in the Moscow press the next day, describes recent attacks on the economist Sun Yeh-fang in terms of opposition to Soviet-style economic orthodoxy. A LITERARY GAZETTE article on the 4th, pegged to the 40th anniversary of the League of Leftist Writers in China, decries "the tragic fate" of Chinese literature and the current fanning of "war psychosis" and chauvinism in the service of Maoism. The preface to a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on 7 March, devoted to the author's reminiscences of his stay in China during the early phases of the cultural revolution, observes that everything today in China is being subordinated to "war hysteria" and denounces the "Maoists" for attempting to implant the "mad idea" that the Soviet Union is planning to invade the PRC.

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Foreign communists again are invoked to criticize Peking in the name of the international communist movement. Reporting sessions of the congress of the Cypriot communist party AKEL, PRAVDA on 7 and 8 cited speeches by foreign delegates denouncing the "anti-Leninist" and "schismatic" policies of "the Maoist leadership."

By contrast, Moscow continues to avoid personal attacks on Mao in broadcasts to China. A 9 March Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress, for example, is careful not to name names in likening the rectification campaign in the CCP in the early 1940's to cultural revolution purges "in the upper echelons of the present regime." It speaks in general terms of similarities between the earlier purge of "the internationalist core" of the party--those amenable to the Soviet and Comintern line--and the current purge of those charged with the "cardinal sin" of being well-disposed toward the USSR. Soviet broadcasts to China occasionally refer to "Mao Tse-tung Thought Study Classes" or to a Mao quotation but have refrained from direct attack on Mao personally since the agreement to hold talks was reached in early October, while domestic media and broadcasts in other foreign-language services resumed attacks on Maoism by name early this year.

Soviet concern over improvement in Sino-U.S. relations is evident in several Mandarin broadcasts warning that the PRC's anti-Soviet policies are abetting the imperialist enemy and harming the cause of the socialist camp. A 9 March commentary alludes to the Warsaw talks in warning that no Sino-U.S. talks "will guarantee China's safety from invasion and raids" by the United States. The commentary seeks to play on inherited mistrust among the Chinese toward the United States and to discredit U.S. appeals for a relaxation of tension as aimed at lowering Chinese vigilance and at encouraging Peking to continue its anti-Soviet line.

The triangular relationship is introduced into a discussion of SALT in a Mandarin broadcast on 7 March summarizing the authoritative PRAVDA article that day on SALT. According to the broadcast, the arms limitation talks "will definitely provide certain answers to the so-called Soviet-U.S. collusion" charged by Peking. There is no such reference in the PRAVDA article itself. The Soviet weekly LIFE ABROAD (No. 8, signed to press on 18 February) had earlier turned the collusion charge against Peking, arguing that in "entering into collusion" with the United States the Chinese are "trying to prevent achievement of an agreement" on limiting strategic arms.

PEKING NCNA on 8 March carried a "recent" article by the leader of the pro-Peking Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) which asserts that the danger of war "has never been so real" since World War II as "at the present moment" and that there is a "very real"

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danger of the use of nuclear weapons. But as if to offset the demoralizing effect of what it calls "scaremongering" propaganda about the horrifying destructiveness of nuclear war, NCNA quotes the article as dismissing nuclear weapons as a paper tiger and as expressing confidence that a war would bring the liberation of mankind nearer. Though there is a reference to "Soviet revisionist social imperialism," the NCNA summary does not mention the border conflict.

A Peking broadcast in Russian on 9 March resurrects an item originally carried by NCNA on 7 February which relates episodes of mutual support between the Chenpao (Damanskiy) area border guards and the local militia and populace. The report recalls the March 1969 incidents in which the Soviets allegedly committed "armed aggression" on Chenpao Island. There have also been scattered references to Chenpao in recent domestic broadcasts.

Peking's latest attack on "Brezhnev and his gang" is contained in an NCNA report on the 7th denouncing the recently concluded Soviet-U.S. cultural exchange agreement as the first deal made by the two sides "in their frequent activities of collusion" since the beginning of this year. As in NCNA's 21 February article on Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, the 7 March report takes note of Soviet anti-Chinese polemics in charging that "several scribes in the pay of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique" have been engaged in "anti-China outcries."

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## USSR AND EAST EUROPE

## MOSCOW PRESSES NEED FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE MEASURES

The Soviet propaganda line on the need to strengthen "collective" defense measures in the face of a growing "imperialist" threat is sharpened in a 7 March PRAVDA article by Col. S. Lukonin entitled "V.I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland." Extending Lenin's views on the defense of "the socialist fatherland" to the defense of "the socialist community," the article argues in effect for a Brezhnev-doctrine-type class approach to "the vitally important problem of strengthening the socialist community." Although the Chinese (who are mentioned directly) and the Yugoslavs (who are not named) are targets of Lukonin's attacks on "right" and "left" revisionists and opportunists, the article appears aimed chiefly at the Romanians, who are resisting Warsaw Pact integration and have been reluctant to allow maneuvers on Romanian soil.

As if to dramatize the Soviet propaganda justification for a strengthened Warsaw Pact, Lukonin warns darkly that "behind the black banner of anticommunism, which is becoming increasingly insolent and subtle, the preparation for a new world war is now taking place." He declares that in the face of this rising threat, "the socialist countries are being forced to intensify their collective measures for the armed defense of their achievements"; thus the Warsaw Pact is being "steadily strengthened and improved."

Adapting Lenin's ideas to the exigencies of the present Soviet propaganda line, Lukonin explains that "the Leninist definition of the fatherland as a given political, cultural, and social environment is opposed to the bourgeois nationalist and opportunist interpretations of the fatherland as a national and geographical phenomenon." He goes on to define the world socialist system as "the creation of the international working class" which "in this sense acts as a single socialist fatherland for the peoples of these countries and for the working people of the entire world." It follows, he argues, that the defense of socialism is "a direct international deed, the sacred duty of peoples and armies of the socialist states." The article goes on to condemn the non-Leninist approach of those "right and 'left' opportunists" and revisionists who "place sovereignty in opposition to internationalism" and advance the "so-called theory of support only from one's own forces." Lenin, it points out, resolutely opposed any split in the revolutionary forces and "any manifestations of nationalism."

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## TIRANA DENOUNCES WARSAW PACT INTEGRATION EFFORTS

An editorial in the Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT on 6 March charges the Soviet Union with trying to mold Warsaw Pact forces into a supranational army as part of a plan to dominate Eastern Europe and use East Europeans in the conflict with China. Calculated to encourage Romanian resistance and to stimulate opposition in other East European countries, the editorial appears prompted by concern over the prospect of a Soviet-controlled international force that could potentially be used against Albania.

ZERI I POPULLIT cites recent articles by Soviet General Shtemenko and Marshal Grechko as evidence that Moscow envisages "joint military units," commenting that such units would be a first step toward "the total integration of the national armies and their conversion into an ordinary Soviet army under the direction and orders of the Marshals of the Soviet Union." Since the units would not operate under any national flag, the paper adds, Moscow would use them to "defend socialism" under the Brezhnev doctrine whenever it decided Soviet interests were threatened. The editorial says Moscow would try to counter the impression that the joint units are occupation troops by dressing them in the uniform of a supranational army and stationing them in East European countries.

In a further effort to arouse nationalist indignation and fear of foreign involvement among Moscow's East European allies, the article warns that another Soviet objective is to use East European "mercenaries" first as "symbolic" forces in the conflict with the Chinese and, should the conflict heat up, actually use them against the PRC.

The editorial points to a common bond between Albania and Romania, praising Bucharest for its resistance to Soviet "threats and blackmail" and pledging Albanian "support" for such "fully just" efforts. It also expresses "understanding of the right of the peoples of Yugoslavia to defend themselves from any threat or attack." A prior similar effort to define a common bond between Albania and the Yugoslavs as well as the Romanians was made in an editorial in ZERI I POPULLIT on 11 April 1969, condemning alleged efforts by the Soviets to "occupy" Romania as they did Czechoslovakia and subsequently to attack Yugoslavia.

Encouraging Bucharest and other Pact members to resist Soviet integrationist pressures, the 6 March editorial concludes: "We do not believe that the peoples of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet peoples will allow themselves to become servants of the renegade Brezhnev-Kosygin clique and be used as docile tools of its enslaving imperialist policy."

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## RCP TAKES MAJOR CREDIT FOR ESTABLISHING GROZA REGIME

Ceausescu uses the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Groza regime in March 1945 to underline the notion that the Romanian party--and by implication not Moscow--played "the decisive" role in bringing communism to Romania. By emphasizing the sacrifices Romania made to achieve its independence, Ceausescu seems to be arguing in effect that Romania has earned its right to present its independent views in international forums. The address, broadcast by Radio Bucharest on 6 March, acknowledges Moscow's "contribution" but observes that the 6 March victory "did not just happen and was not brought about from abroad." It was won, Ceausescu says, "by struggle and grave sacrifices made by the revolutionary democratic forces in Romania under the Romanian party leadership."

Reaffirming Romania's familiar foreign policy principles, Ceausescu goes on to declare that his country is "determined to campaign for the assertion of these principles in relations among all states and to continue in the future, too, to make its active contribution to developing collaboration among peoples and the insuring of peace in the world." Thus, he says, at the present Geneva disarmament talks it is "necessary for the representatives of all interested countries to be able to participate and to express their views." These remarks seem calculated to defend Romania's right to have called at the Geneva disarmament talks the preceding day for "an international document" that would ban "the use of force or the threat of force against another state under all circumstances." Reporting this Romanian proposal on the 5th, AGERPRES said it also provided for "renunciation of military maneuvers on the territory of other states." TASS, recounting the 5 March Geneva session, mentioned that the Romanian delegate called for an early solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament but ignored his remarks on maneuvers and the banning of intervention in the affairs of other countries.

PRAVDA        Moscow marks the 25th anniversary of the installation of the  
ARTICLE       Groza regime with a 6 March PRAVDA article by Gerasimov  
              which plays up the Soviet role in helping the Groza  
government come to power. The article recalls how this first communist-  
dominated government supported "the necessity of radically improving  
relations with the Soviet Union" and "rejected the reactionary attempt  
to impose the 'Marshal Plan' on the country." Gerasimov also reminds  
Bucharest that it is now united with the USSR in the Warsaw Pact and  
CEMA.

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## WEST GERMANY

## GDR DENOUNCES BRANDT, SILENT ON ALTERNATE SUMMIT VENUE PROPOSAL

East German media so far have maintained complete silence on FRG Chancellor Brandt's 9 March proposal that he and GDR Premier Stoph meet in some other city, rather than East Berlin. Authoritative GDR statements broadcast since the Brandt proposal late on the 9th have avoided any reference to a change in venue and persist in harsh criticism of Brandt's proposed Berlin visit in connection with the summit talks, labeling it an "unacceptable political provocation." Speeches and comment closely follow the polemical line laid down in the 9 March GDR Council of Ministers statement. Warsaw media report the resumption of FRG-Polish political talks in Warsaw 9 March, while Moscow maintains silence about the resumption of talks between Foreign Minister Gromyko and FRG State Secretary Bahr in Moscow.

BONN "SABOTAGE" Brandt's proposal for some other, unspecified summit  
OF SUMMIT TALKS meeting site is ignored completely in a 10 March  
speech by GDR State Secretary for West German

Problems Herrmann, as well as in East German newspaper comment reviewed by ADN on 11 March. Herrmann reiterates the line set down in the 9 March Council of Ministers statement and accuses Brandt of "intentionally" making a "political provocation" against the GDR by his planned West Berlin visit. In the most direct reference in current GDR comment to the possibility the summit meeting may not be held, Herrmann observes that "the international press" is "understandably asking ever more openly whether Bonn's aim is not to sabotage the meeting between the heads of government." GDR media have previously stressed that the meeting must be held in "the GDR capital, Berlin," and, while vehemently denying any attempt to set preconditions, have flatly rejected any Brandt travel plans involving a West Berlin visit; for example, Herrmann points out that "the GDR has presented all practicable possibilities" regarding Brandt's travel route.

GDR 9 MARCH The GDR Council of Ministers statement, handed to  
STATEMENT FRG negotiator Sahm on 9 March, was released by ADN  
later the same day, only three hours before release  
of the new Brandt proposal for a change in summit venue. It sustains GDR attempts to cast all blame on the Brandt regime should the Brandt-Stoph meeting be cancelled,\* while reiterating East German willingness

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\* A May 1967 proposal for summit negotiations, renewed by Stoph in a 19 September letter accompanying an earlier GDR draft treaty, proved fruitless and gave rise to GDR recriminations against the Kiesinger government for its insistence upon "sole representation" and its "revanchism" and nuclear aspirations, themes also being exploited in current GDR propaganda.

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to meet. Repeating the standard GDR and Soviet view that West Berlin is an independent political entity, it calls any Brandt visit to West Berlin "a provocation that we cannot and do not wish to accept" and adds that the GDR Government "rejects the attempt to create an issue of conflict by raising the West Berlin question," which it says is not part of the talks. It recalls Brandt's earlier assurances in his 18 February letter to Stoph about stressing areas on which the GDR and FRG agree and declares that "if these are not to remain mere words," Brandt must "forego the political demonstration against the GDR."

The GDR statement makes a strained attempt to extend international law to the route traveled by heads of state, arguing that "the principle of equality requires" that Brandt, when visiting the other party to negotiations, "respect its sovereignty and observe the sovereign rights of the GDR in accordance with the principles of international law as far as the route is concerned." It adds that "if" the two states are to negotiate, "it is surely quite normal that one should arrive at and depart from the railway station or airport of the capital in which the government concerned has its seat."

Compared with the bitter, vituperative NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentaries of 6, 7, and 8 March, however, the GDR statement appears to be a calculated effort to present the GDR as patiently seeking a summit meeting, a "successful conclusion" of the preliminary talks, and as being "interested in holding the meeting soon." The 6 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary denounced the West German press, "led by the Springer press," for a "deliberate press campaign, daily rising in intensity," that employed "deliberate vicious reports," "gross distortions and false reports," and "wild speculations" intended "obviously" to "poison the atmosphere and pose unacceptable conditions" to the GDR. This commentary denounced Springer papers for their "demands" that Brandt "demonstratively" visit West Berlin, saying "no serious politician can assume" the GDR would get involved in such actions, "which contravene international law" and which would "seriously hamper" the pending four-power talks on Berlin, something which the GDR "cannot permit." A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 7 March commentary carried textually by ADN directly questions the Brandt-Scheel regime's sincerity and good intentions, accusing it of employing a "poisoned propaganda gimmick" at this juncture to wring concessions from the GDR in return for "alleged readiness to make concessions" on Bonn's part. Asking rhetorically whether Brandt's attitude is "really better" than his predecessors, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND concludes that "the much-vaunted 'accommodation' shown" by the FRG "consists of a flood of more or less beautiful words and nothing else." It concludes: "We do not expect the West German state, as it is today, to show any accommodation to socialism, and we on our part are not prepared to back down vis-a-vis that state on any point." The third NEUES DEUTSCHLAND attack in as many days, on the 8th,

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denounces FRG spokesman Ahlers for his "impudence" in defending Brandt's right to visit and work in West and East Berlin, calling his remarks "the most brazen formula in which Bonn's revanchist arrogant claim to sole representation has ever been expressed."

MOSCOW RESTRAINT      Soviet media continue to employ comparative  
ON FRG-GDR TALKS      restraint in reporting the FRG-GDR dispute. The  
only available radio comment on the new argument  
over Brandt's proposal to visit West Berlin in connection with the  
summit is a passing reference in the 8 March Moscow domestic service  
commentators' roundtable. Observer Nekrasov ingenuously notes that  
"we are not, of course, in a position to know how these consultations  
are going" and attributes to "Western news agencies" the belief that  
how Brandt travels to East Berlin for the summit meeting is the "touch-  
stone" of the preliminary talks. He adds that behind this issue "which  
one would have thought was a mere formality, a matter of protocol,"  
lies "the demand for recognition of the GDR's full sovereignty" and, on  
the FRG side, "an attempt to gloss over this issue and leave loopholes  
for some kind of revanchist tendencies and ambitions." TASS omits from  
its lengthy summation of the GDR Council of Ministers statement one of  
the most peremptory GDR assertions, that "equal negotiations can only  
come about if both sides recognize each other as sovereign subjects  
under international law," and also leaves out some GDR arguments about  
how Brandt should travel to Berlin. Soviet media have ignored the  
current successive NEUES DEUTSCHLAND attacks on the Brandt regime.

WARSAW, MOSCOW      The resumption of West German talks in Warsaw  
TALKS RESUME      and Moscow has been reported and ignored,  
respectively, by Polish and Soviet media, just as  
in earlier talks. Warsaw coverage is limited to brief reportage on  
the arrival of the FRG delegation headed by Duckwitz and the three  
days of meetings concluding on 11 March. PAP reports on the 11th that  
"a businesslike exchange of views on the matter of normalization of  
mutual relations" took place during the exchanges, which will be  
continued in the second half of April. A 7 March ZYCIE WARSZAWY  
interview with Polish Vice Foreign Minister Willmann stressed that the  
subject of these talks is "the FRG's recognition of the permanence of  
Poland's western border," a recognition which would "initiate a pro-  
cess of normalized relations" between the two countries. The subject  
of FRG-Polish trade talks is mentioned in passing by Willmann, and dis-  
cussed at length by Foreign Trade Minister Burakiewicz in a PAP  
interview on 8 March. He refers to "initial understanding" reached on  
the usefulness of a new five-year agreement on trade and economic and  
scientific-technical cooperation. Noting progress in some matters,  
Burakiewicz adds that no understanding has been reached yet on  
"principles" to make a Polish-FRG agreement conducive to increasing  
mutual trade turnover. He said Poland "fully shares" Brandt's view  
that the political and economic talks are not intertwined and that  
"there is not and cannot be a question of any economic concessions" by  
one side in exchange for "political concessions" by the other.

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Moscow has remained completely silent on the resumption of talks between FRG spokesman Bahr and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 3 March. This is consistent with its previous handling of the opening two rounds in early December and January and early February, which were reported on briefly in February and commented upon only once.

#### FRG INVOLVEMENT IN GAS-CENTRIFUGE ACCORD ATTACKED BY GDR

Consistent with its warnings over the years about alleged West German efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the GDR Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 3 March formally protesting the signing, scheduled for the next day, of an FRG-British-Dutch treaty on the construction and operation of gas-centrifuge plants for the production of enriched-uranium fuel. In addition to the plants' capability to produce reactor fuel, the statement says, they can enrich uranium to such an extent that it can be used as the detonator for nuclear weapons and can process pure plutonium for weapons. The statement calls the gas-centrifuge treaty an "attempt to circumvent the control obligations" of the nonproliferation treaty, noting that one of Bonn's "reservations" in signing the nonproliferation accord stipulates exclusion of a nuclear facility from the treaty's control if effective control of that facility outside West Germany "can be attributed to a nuclear power--that is, Britain." The statement concludes by recalling Article 4 of the GDR draft treaty on normalizing relations with West Germany which proposes that both states refrain from the acquisition of and control over nuclear weapons "in any form whatever."

The gas-centrifuge treaty also comes under fire in a 4 March East Berlin domestic service commentary. While it does not refer to the Foreign Ministry statement, the commentary echoes the statement in warning of the plants' weapons capability and puts little stock in the assurances of the signatories, who "pretend that this involves a purely peaceful project for the fuel supply of nuclear powerplants." What is at issue, the commentary observes, "is not a ban of the gas centrifuges from the world but the question of who has them and for what purposes they are used."

East German propaganda on the coming into effect of the nonproliferation treaty on 5 March touches briefly on the gas-centrifuge agreement. Premier Stoph in a 5 March statement, for example, says West Germany has combined its signing of the nonproliferation treaty with several reservations and has "not abandoned its attempts to secure control over nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO or by production agreements with other states." The 6 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial says that the gas-centrifuge treaty, "by means of which Bonn might obtain plutonium that could be used in weapons, is an infraction" of the nonproliferation accord.

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SOVIET REACTION TASS reported the GDR Foreign Ministry protest on 3 March, taking note of its charge that the gas-centrifuge agreement is an attempt to avoid the control measures of the nonproliferation treaty. Moscow has otherwise given no publicity to the conclusion of the three-nation pact, although Soviet propaganda since late 1968, when negotiations on the treaty began, has routinely attacked the plans for the gas-centrifuge plants.

The only available reaction from the GDR's East European partners comes from Poland. The army newspaper ZOLNEIRZ WOLNOSCI, in a commentary reviewed by PAP on the 6th, says the three-nation pact opens new prospects for the West German nuclear industry, makes possible nuclear production for military purposes, and "is the first step toward Bonn's possession of its own nuclear stockpiles." A 7 March TRYBUNA LUDU article on the nonproliferation accord calls the gas-centrifuge treaty a "clear attempt" by the FRG to widen prospects in the field of nuclear production, adding that "in our opinion this creates the danger that the German Federal Republic might come closer to a collision with the nonproliferation treaty."

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